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Abstract
In an oligopoly, prior to competing in the market, rms have an opportunity to form
pair-wise collaborative links with other rms. These pair-wise links involve a commit-
ment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating rms. The
collection of pair-wise links denes a collaboration network. We study the architecture
of strategically stable networks.
Our analysis reveals that in a setting where rms are ex-ante identical, strategically
stable networks are often asymmetric, with some rms having a large number of links
while others have few links or no links at all. We characterize such asymmetric net-
works; the dominant group architecture, stars, and inter-linked stars are found to be
stable. In asymmetric networks, the rms with many links have lower costs of produc-
tion as compared to rms with few links. Thus collaboration links can have a major
inuence on the functioning of the market.
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1 Introduction
Empirical work suggests that R&D collaboration between rms is common.
1
This empirical
work has also drawn attention to two striking features of collaboration relationships. The rst
feature is the dierence in the number of links across the rms; some rms have a lot of links
while others have relatively few links. These dierences lead to asymmetric collaboration
structures. The second feature is intransitive relations. Intransitive relationships arise when
rms i and j have a link and rms j and k have a link, respectively, but i and k have no
collaboration link.
2
This paper develops a simple model to understand the incentives of
rms to form collaborative links and the nature of strategically stable networks.
Our model has the following structure: We consider an oligopoly setting in which rms form
pair-wise collaborative links with other rms. These pair-wise links involve a commitment
of resources on the part of the collaborating rms and yield lower costs of production for
rms which form the link.
3
The collection of pair-wise links denes a collaboration network
and induces a distribution of costs across the rms in the industry. Given these costs, rms
then compete in the market. A distinctive feature of our model is that we allow a rm to
form collaboration relations with other rms without seeking prior permission of current
collaborators. This has important strategic eects and requires novel methods of analysis.
4
We start by analyzing the case where the costs of forming links are small. In this setting,
we are able to characterize the nature of strategically stable networks under fairly general
conditions. We consider two types of market competition: moderate and aggressive. In a
market with moderate competition, all rms make positive prots but lower cost rms make
1
For instance, in the area of biotechnology the number of collaborations involving the world's largest
rms rose from a total of around 100 in the pre-1987 period, to over 150 in the period 1988-1991. Moreover,
the number of rms involved in these collaborations also increased sharply, doubling from one period to the
next (Delapierre and Mytelka, 1998). A similar pattern is observed in the area of information technology
(Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990).
2
Several authors have plotted the network of collaboration between rms; see e.g., Delapierre and Mytelka
(1998). These plots indicate asymmetric collaborative structures as well as intransitive relations. An example
of intransitive relations observed was the following. In the late 1980's and 1990's, Bristol-Mayers and Bayer
had collaborative links, but Bayer also had collaborative links with Hoechst,, while there were no links
between Bristol-Mayers and Hoechst.
3
We interpret a link as a collaborative R&D project, which involves complementary facilities of the two
rms. The project is costly and hence calls forth resources from the collaborating rms; it yields a process
innovation which lowers the costs of production of the rms involved.
4
The number of possible collaboration networks is very large. In a market with n rms, there are
2
n(n 1)=2
possible networks of collaboration. Thus, if n = 10, then there are over a billion possible networks
of collaboration!
2
larger prots.
5
We rst show that every pair of rms with the same costs must be linked.
This implies that in the class of symmetric networks, i.e., networks where every rm has
the same number of collaboration links, only the complete network can be stable.
6
We then
develop suÆcient conditions for this network to be the unique stable network (Theorem 3.1).
We nd that these conditions, though strong, are satised by a variety of standard models.
7
Under aggressive competition, all but the lowest cost rms make zero prots. This allows
for two cases of interest: rst, in which a lowest cost rm makes prots only if it is the
unique such rm, and second, if all lowest cost rms make positive prots. We nd that in
the rst case, the empty network is the unique strategically stable network.
8
The latter case
corresponds to a model of a patent race with the largest collaborating group winning the
race. In this case, we provide a complete characterization of strategically stable networks
(Theorem 3.2). In particular, we show that stable networks have an asymmetric architecture:
the rms divide themselves into two groups, with one group containing at least three rms
and having the feature that every pair of rms has a collaboration link, while the second
group consists of isolated rms. We refer to this structure as the dominant group architecture.
We next consider the case where costs of forming links are signicant. The analysis now
focuses on the relationship between these costs and the nature of stable networks. For
reasons of tractability we work with the linear demand Cournot model. We rst derive
a general property of the returns from link formation: rms have increasing returns from
links. This implies, in particular, that the empty network and the complete network are the
only symmetric networks that are stable. We then show that the only asymmetric network
that is stable is the dominant group architecture, with the size of this group being sensitive
to the cost of forming links. An interesting aspect of our analysis is a non-monotonicity
in the sustainable size of the dominant group as the costs of forming links increase. Non-
monotonicity manifests itself over an intermediate range of costs: over the initial part of
this range, large as well as small dominant groups are strategically stable; however, over the
latter part, only medium-sized dominant groups are stable and small and large groups are
no longer sustainable (Proposition 4.1).
5
Moderate competition accommodates quantity competition under homogeneous or dierentiated de-
mand, and price competition under dierentiated demand.
6
The complete network is one in which every pair of rms has a link.
7
In particular, the homogeneous product model with quantity competition, and the dierentiated product
model with price and quantity competition fall in this category.
8
The Bertrand model with homogeneous demand falls under the rst case. The empty network is one in
which there are no links.
3
The property of increasing returns from link formation suggests that a rm with many links
may have an incentive to induce a rm with few links to form a collaboration relationship
by oering to subsidize its costs of link formation. This motivates an examination of stable
networks when transfers are allowed between rms. Again we nd that the only symmet-
ric networks that can be stable are the empty and the complete network. In the class of
asymmetric networks, the dominant group architecture continues to be stable. In addition,
the only other asymmetric architectures that are stable are the star and inter-linked stars
(Propositions 4.2-4.3). The results are interesting from an empirical point of view, since
these intransitive network architectures have been oberved in practice.
9
The stability of the
star and inter-linked star architectures also illustrates in a somewhat dramatic fashion how
market dominance can arise in a setting with ex-ante identical rms. They also bring out
clearly the role of transfers across links, since such structures would not be stable in the
absence of transfers.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of group formation and cooperation in oligopolies.
The model of collaborative networks we present is inspired by the recent work on strategic
models of network formation; see e.g., Aumann and Myerson (1989), Bala and Goyal (2000),
Dutta, van den Nouweland and Tijs (1995), Goyal (1993), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and
Kranton and Minehart (2000).
10
We now place our work in relation to the existing literature
on the endogenous formation of groups.
The work of Kranton and Minehart (2000) deals with networks between vertically related
rms. In contrast, our paper studies collaborative ties between horizontally related rms,
i.e., rms which compete in the market subsequently. This leads us to incorporate an explicit
market competition element in our collaboration model. Our paper should thus be seen as
complementary to their work. The analysis in our paper suggests that market competition
has major implications for the nature of collaboration networks.
Issues relating to group formation and cooperation have been a central concern in economics,
and game theory in particular. The traditional approach to these issues has been in terms of
coalitions. In recent years, there has been considerable work on coalition formation in games;
see e.g., Bloch (1995), Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1979), Ray and Vohra (1997), and
Yi (1997,1998). For a survey of this work, refer to Bloch (1997). One application of this
9
See for instance, Figures 4.3 and 4.4 in Delapierre and Mytelka (1998), which plot the architecture of
the collaboration networks in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry.
10
The present paper subsumes our earlier paper, Goyal and Joshi (1999).
4
theory is to the formation of groups in oligopolies. In this literature, group formation is
modeled in terms of a coalition structure which is a partition of the set of rms. Each rm
therefore can belong to one and only one element of the partition, referred to as a coalition.
In our paper, we consider two-player relationships. In this sense, our model is somewhat
restrictive as compared to the work referred to above, which allows for groups of arbitrary
size. However, the principal distinction concerns the nature of collaboration structures we
examine. Our approach accommodates collaborative relations that are non-exclusive. From
a conceptual point of view, this distinction is substantive. It means that we allow for re-
lationships across coalitions. Thus, we consider a class of cooperative structures which is
signicantly dierent from those studied in the coalition formation literature. In particu-
lar, our approach leads to collaboration networks such as stars/inter-linked stars which are
empirically observed but are ruled out in the coalition literature.
A direct comparison of the results in our paper with this literature is diÆcult since there
are other substantive dierences in the models such as the role of spillovers. We therefore
discuss the results of Bloch and Yi in greater detail, after presenting our results, in Section
3.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic model. In Section 3, we
analyze the formation of networks when the costs of forming links are small, while section 4
examines the case where costs of forming links are large. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a setting in which a set of rms rst choose their collaboration links with other
rms. These collaboration agreements are pair-wise and costly and help lower marginal costs
of production. The rms then compete in the product market. We now develop the required
terminology and provide some denitions.
2.1 Networks
Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng denote a nite set of ex-ante identical rms. We shall assume that
n  3. For any i; j 2 N , the pair-wise relationship between the two rms is captured by
a binary variable, g
i;j
2 f0; 1g; g
i;j
= 1 means that a link is established between rms i
5
and j while g
i;j
= 0 means that no link is formed. A network g = f(g
i;j
)
i;j2N
g, is a formal
description of the pair-wise collaboration relationships that exist between the rms. We let G
denote the set of all networks. Let g+ g
i;j
denote the network obtained by replacing g
i;j
= 0
in network g by g
i;j
= 1. Similarly, let g   g
i;j
denote the network obtained by replacing
g
i;j
= 1 in network g by g
i;j
= 0.
A path in g connecting rms i and j is a distinct set of rms fi
1
; : : : ; i
n
g such that g
i;i
1
=
g
i
1
;i
2
= g
i
2
;i
3
=    = g
i
n
;j
= 1. We say that a network is connected if there exists a path
between any pair i; j 2 N . A network, g
0
 g, is a component of g if for all i; j 2 g
0
, i 6= j,
there exists a path in g
0
connecting i and j , and for all i 2 g and j 2 g, g
i;j
= 1 implies
g
i;j
2 g
0
. We will say that a component g
0
 g is complete if g
i;j
= 1 for all i; j 2 g
0
. Finally,
let N
i
(g) = fj 2 N ; g
i;j
= 1g be the set of rms with whom rm i has a link in the network
g, and let 
i
(g) = jN
i
(g)j be the cardinality of this set.
We now dene some networks that play a prominent role in our analysis. The complete
network, g
c
, is a network in which g
i;j
= 1; 8i; j 2 N , and the empty network, g
e
, is a
network in which g
i;j
= 0; 8i; j 2 N , i 6= j. Two other architectures will play a prominent
role in our analysis: the dominant group architecture and the star architecture. The dominant
group architecture is characterized by one complete non-singleton component and a set of
singleton rms. Thus, there is a set of rms N
0
 N with the property that g
i;j
= 1 for
every pair i; j 2 N
0
while for any k 2 NnN
0
, g
k;l
= 0, 8 l 2 Nnfkg. We will let g
k
denote
the network in which there is one non-singleton component of size k and the remaining n k
rms are singletons. The star is a network in which there is a rm i such that g
i;j
= 1 for
all j 6= i and g
j;k
= 0 for every pair of rms j; k 6= i.
2.2 Collaboration Links and Cost Reduction
A collaboration link in our framework can be interpreted as an agreement to jointly invest
in cost-reducing R&D activity. We will suppose that a collaboration link requires a xed
investment, given by f > 0, from each rm. The rms are initially symmetric with zero xed
costs and identical constant returns-to-scale cost functions. Collaborations lower marginal
costs of production. We will use the following specication:
c
i
(g) = 
0
  
i
(g; 1) ; i 2 N: (1)
6
where 
0
is a positive parameter representing a rm's marginal cost when it has no links.
In this case, rm i's marginal costs are linearly declining in the number of links it has with
other rms.
11
In the general case, we will assume that rm i's marginal cost in the network g is a function
of its collaboration links with other rms and is strictly decreasing in the number of these
links:
12
c
i
(g) = c(
i
(g)); c(
i
(g) + 1) < c(
i
(g)); i 2 N: (2)
To rule out uninteresting cases, we will always assume that c
i
(g)  0, 8i 2 N , 8g 2 G. A
network g, therefore, induces a marginal cost vector for the rms which is given by c(g) =
fc
1
(g); c
2
(g); :::; c
n
(g)g. Given this cost vector, and the specication of the demand functions
in the product market, the rms compete in the second stage in the market. For every
network g, we assume there is a well-dened Nash equilibrium in the second stage product
market game. The prots of rm i, gross of the cost of forming links are given by 
i
(g).
13
2.3 Stable Networks
A network g is said to be stable if any rm that is linked to another in the network has a
strict incentive to maintain the link and any two rms that are not linked have no strict
incentive to form a link with each other. This denition is inspired by the notion of stability
presented in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We need to adapt this general denition slightly
to accommodate the dierent cases of xed costs we consider. We, therefore, state the formal
denitions in Sections 3 and 4.
The requirements above are very weak and should be seen as necessary conditions for a
network to be stable. Our analysis illustrates that these weak requirements provide suÆcient
structure in an interesting class of network formation games.
14
11
This is a natural extension to the network framework of the specication used in Bloch (1995) where
marginal cost of i decreases linearly in the number of rms belonging to the same coalition as i.
12
We are assuming that there are no spillovers across links in this model. We briey address the issue of
spillovers in Section 5.
13
This implicitly assumes that there are no coordination problems in choosing across dierent equilibria
at this stage.
14
We have also examined an alternative non-cooperative formulation of the network formation game. In
this formulation, every rm announces a set of links it intends to form with other rms. A link between two
rms i and j is formed if both i and j announce an intention to form such a link. This announcement game
7
3 Small Costs of Link Formation
In this section, we will provide a fairly general analysis of network formation when the xed
costs of forming links are small. When two rms collaborate, they help lower each other's
costs. There are two eects at work here: collaboration lowers a rm's cost but also lowers
its competitor's cost. In addition, a collaboration between two rms generates competitive
eects on non-participating rms. The precise nature of these eects depend on the nature
of market competition. The main point of this section is to illustrate the inuence of market
competition on the architecture of strategically stable networks.
We will suppose that there are small but positive costs to forming links. This motivates
the following simple denition of strategic stability. A network g is stable if the following
conditions are satised:
(i) For g
i;j
= 1, 
i
(g) > 
i
(g   g
i;j
) and 
j
(g) > 
j
(g   g
i;j
)
(ii) For g
i;j
= 0, if 
i
(g + g
i;j
) > 
i
(g), then 
j
(g + g
i;j
)  
j
(g)
We have adapted this denition from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). This denition of
stability reects two main ideas. First, while a link can be severed unilaterally, forming a
link is a bilateral decision, i.e. a link is formed if and only if the two rms involved agree to
form the link. Second, there are no transfers possible across links. Taken together with the
idea of small but positive costs of link formation, this implies that both rms must make
strictly greater prots by forming a link.
3.1 Example: Homogeneous Product Oligopoly
We begin by providing a complete characterization of collaboration networks in a homoge-
neous product oligopoly, i.e., a market where the outputs of the rms are perfect substitutes.
In particular, we restrict attention to the following linear inverse market demand:
15
of link formation was introduced in Dutta et al (1995). We assume that there are some positive but small
costs to forming links. Given any network, the payos to a rm are then dened as in the model presented in
Section 3. We examined the structure of networks that arise in Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies
of this announcement game. Our analysis yields results analogous to those presented in Section 3 below.
15
We analyze the general oligopoly model later in this section.
8
p =   
X
i2N
q
i
;  > 0 (3)
The prots of the rms will depend on the nature of market competition. In this section we
will assume that marginal cost of rm i 2 N is given by (1).
We start with the case of Cournot competition. Given any network g, the Cournot equilib-
rium output can be written as:
q
i
(g) =
(  
0
) + n
i
(g; 1)  
P
j 6=i

j
(g; 1)
(n + 1)
; i 2 N (4)
In order to ensure that each rm produces a strictly positive quantity in equilibrium, we will
assume that (  
0
) + (n  1)
2
 > 0. Aggregate Cournot output for any given g is:
Q(g) =
X
i2N
q
i
(g) =
n(  
0
) + 
P
i2N

i
(g; 1)
(n+ 1)
(5)
The second stage Cournot prots for rm i 2 N are given by 
i
(g) = q
2
i
(g). In our study of
stable networks, we will nd it convenient to use a positive monotone transform of the rm's
prots to write the payos as follows:
T
i
(g) = (  
0
) + n
i
(g; 1)  
X
j 6=i

j
(g; 1) ; i 2 N (6)
We can now characterize the stable collaboration networks under quantity competition.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose there is quantity competition among the rms. If the marginal
cost function satises (1) and demand satises (3), then the complete network, g
c
, is the
unique stable network.
The proofs of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are given in Appendix A. Figure 1a gives an example
of a complete network. The intuition behind the above result is as follows. First note that if
two rms form a link, then the costs of all other rms are unaected, while the cost advantage
to both rms forming a link is the same under (1). An inspection of the prot expression in
(6) reveals that the positive eects on the prots of a rm i from a link with another rm
9
j are given by n, while the negative eects are given by . Thus link formation is clearly
prot enhancing. This argument shows that any network other than the complete network
cannot be stable. To see why the complete network is stable, note that no further links can
be added, while the deletion of a link by a rm i, with (say) rm j only increases the costs
of rm i and j but leaves the costs of all other rms unaected, lowering prots of rm i by
(n  1). Thus it is not protable to delete links either. This completes the argument.
It is useful to contrast our result with that of Bloch (1996) who, under a similar speci-
cation of demand and marginal cost, derives a stable coalition structure consisting of two
asymmetrically-sized blocs in which the number of rms in the larger coalition is the integer
closest to 3(n + 1)=4. This sharp dierence in the results is in part due to the absence of
spillovers in our setting. To see this, let us examine the incentives for link formation for a
rm in a large component and an isolated rm. In our framework, the above arguments show
that both the rms have an incentive to form a link. By contrast, in the setting of Bloch,
due to the implicit assumption of perfect spillovers, the isolated rm gains access to a large
amount of cost-reduction since it accesses all the rms in the component; similarly all the
rms in the component also gain access to this (erstwhile) isolated rm. Thus the returns to
the competing rms are much greater than in our setting, and it is possible that no rm in
the large component wishes to form a link with an isolated rm, and an incomplete network
can be stable. We discuss the issue of spillovers further in the concluding section.
The simultaneous open membership game in Yi (1998) obtains the grand coalition as the
unique outcome of the game. This approach is similar to one in which the decision to join
a coalition is one-sided. In such a game, in the presence of perfect spillovers, a member of
a smaller group always has an incentive to join a larger group. In our paper, link formation
is based on pair-wise incentive compatibility and there are no spillovers. Thus, our result
provides an alternative explanation as to how a grand coalition may endogenously emerge
in equilibrium.
We next take up the case of Bertrand competition. Given a network g, what are the payos
of dierent rms under Bertrand competition? Standard considerations (exploiting the idea
of a nite price grid) allow us to state that there exists an equilibrium, and in this equilibrium
a rm will make prots only if it is the unique minimal cost rm in the market. In other
words:

i
(g) = 0; if c
i
(g)  c
j
(g); for i 6= j; 
i
(g) > 0; if c
i
(g) < c
j
(g); 8 j 6= i: (7)
10
Since g is arbitrary, the above expression allows us to specify the payos for all possible net-
works. What are the stable networks of collaboration in this setting of extreme competition?
The following result provides a complete answer to this question:
Proposition 3.2 Suppose there is price competition among the rms. If the marginal cost
function satises (1) and demand satises (3), then the empty network, g
e
, is the unique
stable network.
Figure 1b presents an example of an empty network. The intuition behind this result is
simple. Suppose g is a non-empty network and that rm i has a link in this network. It is
either the unique minimum cost rm, in which case its collaborators (of whom there must
be at least one) have a incentive to delete their links. If, on the other hand, rm i is not the
unique minimum cost rm then it has a incentive to delete its links. Thus a network g in
which rm i has a link cannot be stable. These arguments are very general; in particular, we
do not make use of the linear structure of the demand or the cost function. This suggests that
the absence of collaborative links is likely to obtain in general settings where competition is
extreme. This result should be seen only as a benchmark case; incentives to form links are
very dierent if we allow for a slight amount of dierentiation in products (see Appendix A
for an illustration of this).
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that the nature of market competition has a signicant
inuence on incentives for collaboration and the architecture of stable networks. We now
study this inuence under more general conditions.
3.2 Moderate Competition
We consider the case where all rms make positive prots but lower cost rms make higher
prots. Such a situation is described as moderate competition. Formally, this situation is
reected in the following assumption:
Assumption MC Fix some g. 
i
(g) > 0 for all i 2 N ; 
i
(g) = 
j
(g) if c
i
(g) = c
j
(g), while

i
(g) > 
j
(g) if c
i
(g) < c
j
(g).
The next assumption concerns the payos of similar cost rms.
11
Assumption SY1 Fix some g. Suppose that for a pair of rms i and j, c
i
(g) = c
j
(g). (i) If
g
i;j
= 0 then 
i
(g + g
i;j
) > 
i
(g) > 0 and 
j
(g + g
i;j
) > 
j
(g) > 0. (ii) If g
i;j
= 1 then

i
(g   g
i;j
) < 
i
(g) and 
j
(g   g
i;j
) < 
j
(g).
Yi (1998, Lemma 3) demonstrates that (SY1) holds under a set of reasonable restrictions on
general homogeneous demand (downward-sloping, concave) and costs (total cost is convex
in own output, total and marginal cost are strictly decreasing with the number of links)
along with a joint restriction on demand and costs. These conditions ensure that a favorable
cost shock to a pair of symmetric rms will increase their net prots. Yi (1998, Section
5) also shows that (SY1) is valid for symmetrically dierentiated demand (where rm i's
payo depends only on the aggregate output of the rival rms). Symmetry in the presence
of moderate competition implies the following property of stable networks.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that (SY1) and (2) hold. Consider a stable network, g. If 
i
(g) =

j
(g), then g
i;j
= 1.
Proof Let g be stable. If 
i
(g) = 
j
(g) = n, then by denition g
i;j
= 1. Therefore,
consider the case where 
i
(g) = 
j
(g) < n and g
i;j
= 0. Under (2) the costs of i and j are
identical if 
i
(g) = 
j
(g). Under assumption (SY1)(i), it follows that 
i
(g+ g
i;j
) > 
i
(g) and

j
(g+g
i;j
) > 
j
(g). This violates requirement (ii) of stability and contradicts the hypothesis
that g is stable.
2
Proposition 3.3 has several interesting implications for the nature of stable networks. The
rst implication is that a stable network cannot have two or more singleton components.
This implies in particular that the empty network cannot be stable. The second implication
is that the star/hub-spokes network is not stable. This is because in all these networks,
there are at least two rms i and j who have the same number of links but g
i;j
= 0. By
Proposition 3.3, such rms have an incentive to form a link.
16
A third implication of this
result is that if a stable network contains two or more complete components then they must
be of unequal size. The result above thus implies that if all rms have the same cost, then
every pair of rms must be linked; thus, the only symmetric network that can be stable is
the complete network. Our next result derives conditions under which the complete network
is the unique stable network.
16
Our analysis in section 4 will illustrate that this property also obtains for large costs of forming links
but is no longer valid when we allow for transfers across rms.
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Theorem 3.1 Suppose that hypotheses (MC) and (SY1) hold. Then the complete network,
g
c
, is stable. If in addition, for every network g and any link g
i;j
= 0 it is true that 
i
(g +
g
i;j
) > 
i
(g) and 
j
(g + g
i;j
) > 
j
(g) then the complete network, g
c
, is the unique stable
network.
Proof We provide a proof of the rst statement. The second statement is immediate and
a proof is omitted. In g
c
, 
i
(g
c
) = n   1; 8i 2 N . Therefore, all rms have the same cost
and this is the minimum cost. There are no links to add so requirement (ii) of stability is
automatically satised. We check requirement (i) next. Suppose we set g
i;j
= 0 for some
pair i and j. In the ensuing network, g
c
  g
i;j
, assumption (SY1)(ii) implies that both rms
i and j loose strictly. This implies that requirement (i) is also satised. Thus g
c
is stable.
2
The additional monotonicity condition in Theorem 3.1 may seem strong. However, it is
satised by a variety of standard oligopoly models. First, we note that it satised by the
standard model of a dierentiated oligopoly, with linear demand and linearly reducing costs
(as in expression (1)). The calculations for both price and quantity competition are given in
Appendix A. Second, we note that the monotonicity condition is also satised if each of the
rms is a monopoly in its own market. This is true since the only `costs' of forming links in
our model arise out of the greater competitiveness of a rm whose costs are lowered. However,
if the other rms are in unrelated markets then there is no `cost' to forming additional links
while there are benets in terms of of lowering marginal costs of production. It is then
immediate that in such a case every pair of rms has an incentive to form links and thus the
unique stable network is the complete network. Finally, it can be shown that it is satised by
Cournot oligopoly under fairly general demand conditions. Suppose that the inverse demand,
p(Q), satises the following general specication: p(Q) is a twice continuously dierentiable
function with p
0
(Q) < 0 and p
00
(Q)  0. We have shown that if inverse demand satises
this condition and the cost reduction is linear, then the additional monotonicity condition
on prots of the rms is also satised.
17
17
Due to space constraints, we have omitted them from the paper. The details of these derivations are
available from the authors upon request.
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3.3 Aggressive Competition
The notion of aggressive competition should be seen as a generalization of Bertrand compe-
tition with homogeneous products. We will say that competition among rms is aggressive
if all but the lowest cost rms make zero prots. This section provides a complete charac-
terization of strategically stable networks under aggressive competition.
There are two sub-cases: one, the lowest cost rm makes positive prots only if it is the
unique such rm, and two, all the lowest cost rms make positive prots. The former case
is written as follows:
Assumption B Fix some g. If c
i
(g)  c
j
(g), then 
i
(g) = 0, while if c
i
(g) < c
j
(g) for all
j 2 Nnfig then 
i
(g) > 0.
This specication generalizes the Bertrand competition to allow for general demand functions
and also general cost reduction functions. The arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.2
generalize in a straightforward way to show that the empty network is the unique strategically
stable network under Assumption (B).
We now take up the case where every lowest cost rm make positive prots. By way of
motivation, consider a set of rms that are competing to apply for a patent for a cost
reducing process technology. Suppose that each of the rms has some useful complementary
knowledge. If they collaborate, then this knowledge can be jointly used to lower costs.
Moreover, only the lowest cost technology is patented. Once the patent is available, it is
randomly allotted to one of the rms who have the lowest cost technology. Price competition
then ensures that only this rm makes prots. The positive prots should be seen as the
(ex-ante) expected prots from collaboration.
Assumption AC Fix some g. If c
i
(g) > c
j
(g), then 
i
(g) = 0, while if c
i
(g)  c
j
(g) for all
j 2 Nnfig then 
i
(g) > 0.
In our analysis we shall use the following symmetry assumption with respect to the lowest
cost rms.
Assumption SY2 Fix some g. Suppose that for a pair of rms i and j, c
i
(g) = c
j
(g) =
min
k2N
c
k
(g). (i) If g
i;j
= 0 then 
i
(g + g
i;j
) > 
i
(g) > 0 and 
j
(g + g
i;j
) > 
j
(g) > 0. (ii)
If g
i;j
= 1 then 
i
(g   g
i;j
) < 
i
(g) and 
j
(g   g
i;j
) < 
j
(g).
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Assumption (SY2) is weaker than Assumption (SY1) since it applies only to the minimum
cost rms. Once again, suÆcient conditions on demand and costs under which (SY2) holds
are provided in Yi (1998, Lemma 3 and Section 5). Symmetry in the presence of aggressive
competition has strong implications for collaboration. This is demonstrated in the following
result.
Theorem 3.2 Let n  4. Suppose (AC) and (SY2) hold and marginal cost is specied
by (2). Then a network is stable if and only if it is a dominant group network g
k
, with
k 2 f3; 4;    ; ng.
The proof of this result is given in Appendix A. Figure 2 presents the dominant group
networks in a market with 5 rms. We provide a sketch of the arguments. First, we show
that any non-singleton component in a stable network must be complete. In proving this
property, we also establish that all rms in a non-singleton component must have the same
costs and that these costs must be the minimum in the given network. Second, we show that
there can be at most one non-singleton component in a stable network. These two properties
reduce the set of candidates for stable networks dramatically to a subset of dominant group
networks.
18
We note that the number of stable networks is very small as compared to the number of
total networks. For example, when n is 3, 4, 5 or 6, the total number of networks is given by
8, 64, 1024 and 32768, respectively. By contrast, the number of stable networks is given by
3, 5, 16, and 42, respectively. Thus the two simple requirements of stability lead to a strong
restriction on the class of networks.
4 Large Costs of Link Formation
In general, R & D collaboration agreements will involve commitment of funds. This leads us
to study the model where the costs of forming links are substantial. We suppose that each
link imposes a cost of f > 0 on each of the two rms forming the link. No costs are incurred
if the link is not formed. The main results in this section pertain to the relationship between
the costs of forming links and the architecture of strategically stable networks.
18
The above result is stated for n  4. It is easily seen that in case of n = 3 an analogous result obtains:
a stable network is either complete or has two components, one component with two rms and the other
component with a singleton rm. We have stated the result for n  4 as it allows for a simpler statement.
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In the analysis so far, we have worked with the assumption of negligible costs. This has
allowed us to study incentives of link formation simply in terms of the `sign' of the terms.
In the presence of large costs of forming links, an assessment of the incentives to form links
requires an explicit measurement of the benets of links. This complicates the analysis
considerably, and to get our main points across easily, we study the Cournot model with
linear demand. We believe that some of our main insights hold more generally and we will
clarify the scope of the analysis below.
We incorporate the xed costs of forming links in the payos as follows. Fix a network g.
The net prot of each rm i 2 N is given by: 
i
(g) = 
i
(g)   
i
(g)f , while the gross
prot is given by 
i
(g) = q
2
i
(g). Given a network g, let g
 i
denote the network in which all
of rm i's links are deleted. We can now dene a stable network as follows.
Denition 4.1 Let f be the xed cost of link formation. A network g is stable, if the
following conditions hold.
1. For g
i;j
= 1, 
i
(g)  
i
(g   g
i;j
)  f; 
j
(g)  
j
(g   g
i;j
)  f
2. For g
i;j
= 0, 
i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g) > f =) 
j
(g + g
i;j
)  
j
(g) < f
3. For every i 2 N , 
i
(g)  
i
(g)f  
i
(g
 i
).
In words, the rst two conditions require respectively that in a stable network, any rm that
is linked to another has no incentive to sever the link, and any two rms that are not linked
should have no incentive to establish a collaboration link. These two conditions constitute
a \marginal" check for stability. The third condition is an \aggregate", or \global", check
for stability which requires that a rm should nd it protable to maintain its collaboration
links in the network rather than not having any links. This condition can be seen as an
individual rationality condition for participation in the network.
We focus on the homogeneous demand model with linear demand. We rst note that with
small costs of forming links the empty network was the unique stable network under price
competition. Clearly, the same result will obtain once we assume that there are large costs
of forming links. Therefore, in the rest of the analysis in this section, we will focus our
attention on quantity competition.
Our rst result establishes that gross prots of a rm exhibit increasing returns to the number
of links which the rm has with other rms.
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Lemma 4.1 Consider any network g and distinct rms i; j; k 2 N such that g
i;j
= g
i;k
= 0.
Then:

i
(g + g
i;j
+ g
i;k
)  
i
(g + g
i;j
) > 
i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g) (8)
Proof First of all note that the Cournot output of rm i is strictly increasing with each
additional link: q
i
(g + g
i;j
)  q
i
(g) = (n  1)=(n+ 1) > 0
Recall that for any network g, the gross prot of i is 
i
(g) = q
2
i
(g). It follows that:

i
(g + g
i;j
+ g
i;k
)  
i
(g + g
i;j
) =
(n  1)
(n+ 1)
[q
i
(g + g
i;j
+ g
i;k
) + q
i
(g + g
i;j
)]
>
(n  1)
(n+ 1)
[q
i
(g + g
i;j
) + q
i
(g)]
= 
i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g) (9)
This proves the result.
2
We note that by virtue of increasing returns in gross prots, condition (3) implies condition
(1) in the denition of stability. Therefore, it suÆces to verify conditions (2) and (3) when
checking the stability of any network.
We now develop a complete characterization of the architecture of stable networks. We start
by noting a `transitivity' implication of the increasing returns property.
Lemma 4.2 Let g be a network which is stable under xed cost f of link formation. Let i
and j be two distinct rms. Then g satises the following property: suppose there exists a
rm k 6= i; j such that g
i;k
= 1 and a rm l 6= i; j such that g
j;l
= 1; then, g
i;j
= 1.
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that g is stable but g
i;j
= 0. Since g is stable,
it follows that 
i
(g)   
i
(g   g
i;k
)  f . From the property of increasing returns (Lemma
4.1)it follows that 
i
(g+ g
i;j
)  
i
(g) > 
i
(g)  
i
(g  g
i;k
)  f: Thus rm i has an incentive
to form a link with rm j. The only property we have used is that rm i has a link with
some other rm. In this respect the situation of rm j is symmetric. Therefore, using an
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identical argument, we can show that rm j has an incentive to form a link with rm i. This
establishes that g is not stable, a contradiction.
2
This result has a number of interesting implications. Firstly, it implies that any stable
network g can have at most one non-singleton component, g
0
. Furthermore, g
0
must be
complete, i.e. all rms in this component must have links with each other. Thus, a stable
network will have the dominant group architecture. Recall that g
k
denotes the network in
which there is one non-singleton complete component of size k and the remaining n   k
rms are singletons. Secondly, this result implies that there are only two possible symmetric
stable networks: the empty and the complete.
We now provide a complete characterization of stable networks. Recall that g
k
refers to a
dominant group network in which the dominant group has k rms.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that marginal cost satises (1), demand satises (3) and that
rms compete in quantities. Then there exist numbers F
0
, F
1
, F
2
, and F
3
, where F
0
< F
1
<
F
2
< F
3
, with the following property: (1). For f < F
0
, g
c
is the unique stable network. (2)
For F
0
 f < F
1
, a network g
k
is stable if and only if k 2 fk(f); :::; ng, with k(f) > 1.
(3) For F
1
 f < F
3
, a network g
k
is stable if and only if k 2 fk(f); :::;

k(f)g, with
1  k(f) <

k(f) < n. (4) For f > F
2
, g
e
is a stable network. Moreover, if f > F
3
then g
e
is the unique stable network.
Proof Consider a dominant group network, g
k
. A rm in the non-singleton component of
size k has no incentive to delete all its links if:
Y (k) 
(n  1)
(n + 1)
2
[2(  
0
) + (k   1)(n+ 3  2k)]  f (10)
If the above condition is satised, then by virtue of the property of increasing returns (Lemma
4.1), a rm in the non-singleton component would always want to form a link with an isolated
rm. Therefore, if g is stable, then the isolated rm should have no incentive to form a link
with a rm in the non-singleton component. This requires:
X(k) 
(n  1)
(n+ 1)
2
[2(  
0
) + (n  1)   2k(k   1)] < f (11)
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A network g
k
is stable if and only if it satises (10) and (11). By inspection, we see that
X(k) is declining in k. Further, X(n 1) = F
0
. Regarding Y (k), it is initially increasing and
then decreasing in k. Note that F
1
= Y (n), F
2
= Y (2) = X(1), and F
3
= Y (k

). Further,
F
0
< F
1
< F
2
< F
3
. The proof now follows from Figures 3 and 4.
2
Figure 4 illustrates the nature of stable architectures, as the cost of forming links f varies.
We rst note that the cost of forming collaboration links has a signicant impact on the
structure of the collaboration network. In particular, for low costs, the complete network is
uniquely stable, for moderate costs only networks with relatively large dominant groups are
stable, for high costs, only medium size dominant groups are stable (small and large groups
are not sustainable), while for very high costs, the empty network is uniquely stable. Hence,
the eect of R&D costs on the size of the dominant group is non-monotonic. The intuition
for this pattern is as follows: when costs are low, the incentive constraint of the isolated
rm to form a link is binding. The marginal payo to an isolated rm from an additional
link is declining in the size of the dominant group. Hence, as the costs of forming R&D
collaboration links increase, smaller groups are suÆcient to discourage the isolated rm from
forming a link. However, beyond a certain cost level, the incentive constraint for a rm in
the dominant group to retain its links is binding. The returns from links to a rm in a
dominant group are non-monotonic in the size of the dominant group: they are increasing
for group sizes until some critical value k

, and then declining. This implies that for high
cost levels, small and large dominant groups are not stable.
Secondly, we note that the architecture with dominant groups reects sharp asymmetries
in the market outcome. This suggests that the possibilities of collaboration lead to very
asymmetric outcomes in spite of ex-ante identical rms. And, most importantly, for a large
class of parameters, such asymmetric networks are the only stable networks. This means
that in these circumstances, rms only want a certain number of collaborators; this creates
an incentive to preempt and form links early.
Finally, we note that the key property which drives the characterization results of this
section is increasing returns in gross prots. This property ensures that only the empty
and complete networks can be stable in the class of symmetric networks, and only the
dominant group architecture can be stable in the class of asymmetric networks. Our analysis,
therefore, implies that only three architectures - empty, complete and dominant group - will
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be candidates for stability in any general model of network formation where the reduced
form payo to each player displays increasing returns.
4.1 Transfers
The property of increasing returns suggests that rms with many links may have an incentive
to make transfers to rms who are poorly linked to induce them to form links. These con-
siderations motivate an analysis of the nature of stable networks when transfers are allowed
across rms. This section provides a characterization of stable networks when transfers are
allowed. We nd that stars (and variants of this architecture) are strategically stable in this
setting.
Let t
i
= ft
1
i
; :::t
n
i
g be the transfers oered by rm i to other rms. We shall suppose that
t
j
i
 0, for all i; j 2 N , and that t
i
i
= 0, for all i 2 N . We modify the concept of stability to
accommodate the possibility of transfers. The concept of strategic stability we use is dened
as follows.
Denition 4.2 A network g is stable against transfers if:
1. For all g
i;j
= 1, [
i
(g)  
i
(g   g
ij
)] + [
j
(g)  
j
(g   g
i;j
)] > 2f
2. For all g
i;j
= 0, [
i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g)] + [
j
(g + g
i;j
)  
j
(g)] < 2f
3. There exist transfers t
i
2 R
n
, i = 1; 2; :::n such that

i
(g)  
i
(g)f +
X
j2N
i
(g)
(t
i
j
  t
j
i
)  
i
(g
 i
); (12)
We rst note that increasing returns from collaboration obtain in this setting as before. This
in turn implies that there can be at most one non-singleton component in a stable network.
A related implication of increasing returns is the following result on the local structure of a
stable network. The following lemma shows that if rm i has a link with rm j in a network
g which is stable against transfers, then it must also have a link with every rm k which has
as many links as j in the network g   g
i;j
.
Lemma 4.3 If g is stable against transfers, then it satises the following property: suppose
g
i;j
= 1 for distinct i; j 2 N ; then, g
i;k
= 1 for all k 2 N satisfying 
k
(g  g
i;j
)  
j
(g  g
i;j
).
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Lemma 4.3 provides a simple \marginal" check for stability against transfers by examining
the incentive for two rms in a network g to be jointly better o by forming a link. If i and
j can jointly prot from a link, then this will lower the prots of all rms k 6= i; j and may
lead some other rms to sever their links. What is true, however, throughout this process of
readjustment is that the original network g could not have been stable against transfers.
We start by noting that an implication of increasing returns in gross prots is that in the
class of symmetric networks there are only two possible stable networks: the empty and the
complete. The proof follows as a corollary of the property of increasing returns (see Lemma
4.1) and is, therefore, omitted.
We now turn to the characterization of asymmetric networks. We start with a class of
asymmetric connected networks that are commonly observed in empirical work and are stable
only in the presence of transfers. These are the star and inter-linked star architectures. We
rst determine the conditions under which the star (or hub-spokes network) is stable against
transfers.
Proposition 4.2 Let n  4. Suppose that cost satises (1), demand satises (3) and that
rms compete in quantities. Then there exist F
H
and F
L
, where 0 < F
L
< F
H
such that the
star architecture is stable against transfers if and only if F
L
< f < F
H
.
The proof requires a verication of the three conditions of stability. First, we need to establish
that no rm has an incentive to delete an existing link. This generates a upper bound on
the value of f . Next we check that no pair of spoke rms has an incentive to form a link.
This generates a lower bound on the value of f . Finally, we check that the transfers required
to induce the spoke rms to form links with the center (or hub) are indeed feasible. This
generates another upper bound on the value of f . Putting these bounds together yields the
conditions in the result. The details of the computations are given in Appendix B.
We now elaborate on this result. First, in the star, each of the spoke rms derives a relatively
low return from its link, due to the relative cost disadvantage with respect to the center.
Hence, the stability of the star architecture is critically dependent on transfers from the
center. If transfers were not permitted, each spoke rm would sever its link with the hub
rm. This is also indicative of how market dominance can arise in a setting with ex-ante
identical rms.
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Second, inspecting the terms F
L
and F
H
in the proof of Proposition 4.2 shows that the star
is stable for all f 2 [0;1) as n ! 1, i.e over the entire parameter space. This result is
once again a consequence of increasing returns in gross prots: for any xed cost f of link
formation, however high, the center will be able to use transfers to induce spoke rms to form
a link if its marginal prots from the links are high enough; the center's marginal prots in
turn will be large enough if there are a suÆcient number of spoke rms (i.e. a large enough
value of n(f)) for the center to potentially form links with.
Third, Lemma 4.3 highlights an important relationship between a star and the connectedness
of a stable network. In particular, it implies that if a network g is stable against transfers,
and the non-singleton component is a star, then g must be connected. To see this, let k be
some rm which does not belong to the star component. Since there can be at most one
non-singleton component in a stable network, 
k
(g) = 0. Now consider a hub, i, and a spoke,
j, in the star component. By denition, 
j
(g  g
i;j
) = 
k
(g  g
i;j
) = 0. Then, by Lemma 4.3,
i should have had a link with k as well.
In addition to the star, the only other candidates for stability in the class of connected
asymmetric networks are the inter-linked stars. In order to motivate the inter-linked star
architectures, let g be any connected network. Consider a partition of the set of rms,
fh
1
(g); h
2
(g); : : : ; h
m
(g)g, with h
l
(g)\h
k
(g) = ; for l 6= k, and [
m
l=1
h
l
(g) = N . Further, (i) if
i; j 2 h
l
(g), then 
i
(g) = 
j
(g), (ii) if i 2 h
l
(g) and j 2 h
k
(g), l < j, then 
i
(g) < 
j
(g), and
(iii) if i 2 h
1
(g), then 
i
(g)  1 (since g is connected). We now characterize the number of
links within an element h
l
(g) as well as across h
l
(g), l = 1; 2; :::; m in a stable network. This
characterization result shows that stable networks have an inter-linked star architecture.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose that marginal cost satises (1), demand satises (3) and that
rms compete in quantities. Let g 6= g
c
be a connected network. If g is stable against transfers
then it satises the following properties. (i). If i 2 h
l
(g), j 2 h
l
0
(g), l 6= l
0
.j; then
i
(g)  

j
(g)j  2. (ii) If i 2 h
m
(g), then 
i
(g) = n  1. (iii) If g
i;j
= 1 for i 2 h
l
(g) and j 2 h
l
0
(g),
then g
i;k
= 1 for any k 2 h
l
00
(g) where l
00
 l
0
. Moreover, for any i 2 h
1
(g), g
i;j
= 1 if and
only if j 2 h
m
(g). (iv) If i 2 h
m l
(g), then g
i;j
= 1 if and only if j 2 h
k
(g), k > l.
The proof of this result is given in Appendix B. Inter-linked stars are illustrated in Figure 5.
For the case n = 6, these are the only asymmetric connected networks that are stable
against transfers according to Proposition 4.3. Figure 5a presents a star, Figure 5b presents
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a network with two inter-linked stars with rms 1 and 2 forming two hubs, Figure 5c presents
a network with three inter-linked stars with rms 1,2 and 3 forming the hubs. Finally, Figure
5d presents a network with four inter-linked asymmetric stars: the star with rm 1 as the
hub is larger (in the sense of being connected to more spoke rms) than the three smaller
stars with rms 2,3 and 4 as the hubs.
Proposition 4.3 also implies that in the class of unconnected asymmetric networks, if the
non-singleton component is incomplete, then it will be an inter-linked star. Note, however,
that the non-singleton component cannot be a star by virtue of part (i) of the proposition.
In fact, as we argued earlier, if the non-singleton component is a star, then the network
must be connected. If the non-singleton component in an asymmetric unconnected network
is complete, then we have the familiar dominant group network, g
k
. With regard to this
architecture, we can now prove:
Proposition 4.4 Suppose that cost satises (1), demand satises (3) and that rms compete
in quantities. If g
k
is stable against transfers then it is also stable. The converse, however,
is not true.
Proof Suppose g
k
is stable against transfers. Then, for any i; j such that g
i;j
= 0, net
prots must satisfy:

i
(g) + 
j
(g) < 
i
(g + g
i;j
) + 
j
(g + g
i;j
) (13)
This implies that if 
i
(g + g
i;j
) > 
i
(g), then 
j
(g + g
i;j
) < 
j
(g). Therefore, condition (2)
in the denition of stability is also satised.
Since g
k
is stable against transfers, for any i; j such that g
i;j
= 1:

i
(g) + 
j
(g) > 
i
(g   g
i;j
) + 
j
(g   g
i;j
) (14)
However, in g
k
, the only rms who are linked are those which belong to the non-singleton
complete component. Therefore, these rms have the same net prots, i.e. 
i
(g) = 
j
(g)
and 
i
(g   g
i;j
) = 
j
(g   g
i;j
). It follows from (14) that 
i
(g) > 
i
(g   g
i;j
) and 
j
(g) >

j
(g   g
i;j
). Therefore, condition (1) in the denition of stability is also satised.
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Since all rms in the non-singleton complete component have identical prots, it follows that
any net transfers between these rms must be zero. Therefore, if g
k
satises condition (3)
in the denition of stability against transfers, then it also satises condition (3) of stability.
The converse of the above implication is not true: it is possible for g
k
to be stable for some
range of values of f but not be stable against transfers. Consider the case where n = 4 and
the network g
2
where rms 1 and 2 are linked while rms 3 and 4 are singletons with no
links. It can be veried that g
2
is pairwise stable if f 2 (
3
25
[2( 
0
) ] ;
3
25
[2( 
0
)+2]).
However, by virtue of Lemma 4.3, g
2
is not stable against transfers.
2
This result shows that in the class of dominant group networks, allowing for transfers renes
the set of stable networks.
5 Conclusion
Empirical research suggests that collaboration among rms is common; there is also some
evidence to suggest that this collaboration has been increasing in recent years. Collaboration
between rms seems to display two striking patterns: one, the overall structure of collabora-
tion in an industry is often asymmetric and two, the relations are intransitive. In this paper,
we have developed a simple model of network formation to examine the incentives of rms
to form collaboration links with other rms. In particular, we have been concerned with the
interaction between market competition, on the one hand, and the networks of collaboration,
on the other hand.
Our analysis has claried the nature of collaboration structures that are strategically stable
under dierent market conditions. An important nding is that even in settings where rms
are (ex-ante) symmetric, strategically stable networks are often asymmetric, with some rms
having many collaboration links, while other rms are poorly linked. We characterized such
structures, nding that the star, inter-linked stars and the dominant group architecture are
strategically stable. These asymmetries translate into dierent levels of competitiveness
for rms and hence have a serious inuence on market performance. The model of links
between rms which we have used is quite simple and should be seen as a rst step in a more
systematic analysis of the interaction between rms' collaboration networks and markets.
We now briey discuss some issues that should be explored in future work.
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First, we take up the issue of spillovers. Our analysis does not accommodate spillovers across
the collaborative links of rms. In the received literature, spillovers from the R&D activity of
rm i is assumed to aect rms j 6= i uniformly.
19
In our framework, one plausible denition
of `distance' between rms in a network, is the number of links in the shortest path between
the rms. This would allows us to implement the more realistic idea that rms that are `far
apart' receive lower spillovers as compared to rms that are `close' in the network.
The second issue is social welfare. The potential conict between stable and eÆcient out-
comes is an important one which has gured prominently in the coalition formation literature.
We have been able to obtain a characterization of eÆciency in the case of a homogeneous
product oligopoly with small xed costs of link formation. In the case of price competition,
a network g is eÆcient if and only if there are two or more rms with (n 1) links. Since the
empty network is uniquely stable, we see a conict between stability and eÆciency. In the
case of quantity competition, the complete network is uniquely eÆcient over a large range of
parameter values ( > 3
0
and 
0
> (n  1)). Over this range, there is no conict between
stable and eÆcient networks.
20
Clearly, the architecture of eÆcient networks, particularly
in the presence of large xed costs of link formation, is an important one which needs to be
examined in future research.
Thirdly, we discuss the role of ex-ante asymmetries between rms. In our analysis, we have
assumed that all rms are ex-ante symmetric with respect to initial costs and have the same
cost reduction function. This seems to us to be the natural starting point, and our results
illustrate how signicant network asymmetries can emerge even in such a symmetric setting.
In some important cases, however, it is natural to start with asymmetric rms. While we
expect that asymmetric networks will become more prominent, further work on this subject
is needed to clarify the precise structure of such networks.
19
There is a very large literature on the subject of R& D spillovers. See e.g., d'Aspremont, and Jacquemin
(1988), Katz (1986), Suzumura (1992) and Vonortas (1994).
20
We thank Sang-Seung Yi for pointing out that over some parameter range, a dominant group network
with k = n  1 may be eÆcient.
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6 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.1 We rst show that g
c
is stable. In g
c
; 
i
(g
c
) = n  1; 8i 2 N .
Therefore, rm i has a marginal cost of 
0
  (n  1) and payo of:
T
i
(g
c
) = (  
0
) + (n  1) (15)
There are no links to add so condition (ii) of stability is automatically satised. We check
condition (i) next. Suppose we set g
i;j
= 0 for some pair i and j . In the ensuing network,
g
c
  g
i;j
, the payo to i is given by:
T
i
(g
c
  g
i;j
) =   (n  1)[
0
  (n  2)] + (n  2)[
0
  (n  1)] = (  
0
) (16)
The payo to rm j is identical. There is no incentive to delete link g
i;j
= 1 since T (g
c
)  
T
i
(g
c
  g
i;j
) = (n  1) > 0.
We now show that g
c
is the unique stable network. Consider a stable network g 6= g
c
. Then,
there exists a pair of rms i; j 2 N with g
i;j
= 0. We show that both i and j are strictly
better o by forming a link. In the network, g + g
i;j
, the payo to rm i is given by:
T
i
(g + g
i;j
) = (  
0
) + n
i
(g + g
i;j
)  
j
(g + g
i;j
)  
X
k 6=i;j

k
(g + g
i;j
)) (17)
Note that 
l
(g + g
i;j
) = 
l
(g) + 1 for l = i; j and 
k
(g + g
i;j
) = 
k
(g) for k 6= i; j. Therefore,
T
i
(g + g
i;j
)   T
i
(g) = (n   1) > 0. An identical argument establishes that for rm j,
T
j
(g + g
i;j
)   T
j
(g) = (n   1) > 0. Thus, condition (ii) is violated and g is not stable, a
contradiction. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Consider some non-empty network g. There are two possi-
bilities. First, there is some rm i 2 N which is the unique lowest cost rm. But this
implies that rm i must have at least two links since all rms are ex-ante identical. However,
since rm i is the unique lowest cost rm, all other rms make zero prots. In particular,
consider j 6= i such that g
i;j
= 1. For this rm, condition (i) of stability is violated since

j
(g) = 
j
(g  g
i;j
) = 0. Hence, rm i cannot be uniquely minimal cost in a stable network.
The second possibility, given that links are bilateral, is that one or more pairs of rms have
minimal cost. Let i; j 2 N be two rms with minimal costs. Under price competition both
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rms make zero prots. If these rms would delete their links they would still make zero
prots. Thus 
i
(g) = 
i
(g   g
i;j
) = 0. This once again violates condition (i) of stability.
Thus the only candidate for a stable network is g
e
. Condition (i) is trivially satised since
there are no links to sever. In the network g
e
+ g
i;j
, there are two lowest cost rms, i and j.
From (7), it follows that both rms will get a payo of zero. Thus condition (ii) is satised.
This completes the proof. 2
The Dierentiated Product Oligopoly: Consider rst the case of quantity competition
in a dierentiated oligopoly. The inverse demand for rm i 2 N is given by:
p
i
=   q
i
  
X
j 6=i
q
j
; i 2 N (18)
where 0 <  < 1. The Cournot output of rm i 2 N , given a network g, is:
q
i
(g) =
(  
0
)(2  ) + [2 + (n  1)]
i
(g)  
P
k

k
(g)
[2 + (n  1)][2  ]
(19)
The Cournot equilibrium prots are given by 
i
(g) = q
2
i
(g). Under a positive monotonic
transform, the payo to rm i 2 N can be written as:

i
(g) = (  
0
)(2  ) + [2 + (n  1)]
i
(g)  
X
k

k
(g) (20)
Under (1), it can be easily veried that for n  3:

i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g) = [2 + (n  3)] > 0 (21)
Therefore, the additional monotonicity condition of Theorem 3.1 is met, (which also implies
that (SY1) is satised). Hence, the complete network is the unique stable network in the
case of quantity competition. This result can be contrasted with Bloch (1995, Proposition
3) where, under the restriction 0 <  < 1, the equilibrium coalition structure consists of two
asymmetrically-sized coalitions with the size of the larger coalition being the integer closest
to (3n  1)=4 + 1=(2).
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Next, we consider price competition in a dierentiated oligopoly. Inverting the inverse de-
mand given by (18) yields the demand functions:
q
i
= a  bp
i
+ c
X
j 6=i
p
j
; i 2 N (22)
where the parameters of the demand function satisfy:
a =

1 + (n  1)
; b =
1 + (n  2)
(1  )(1 + (n  1))
; c =

(1  )(1 + (n  1))
The Bertrand equilibrium prices, given the network g, are:
p
i
(g) = =
a+ b
0
2b + (1  n)c
 
b
i
(g)
2b+ c
 
bc
P
k2N

k
(g)
[2b+ (1  n)c][2b + c]
(23)
The Bertrand equilibrium prots are:

i
(g) = b [p
i
(g)  
0
+ 
i
(g)]
2
; i 2 N (24)
Under a positive monotonic transform, the Bertrand payos can be written as:

i
(g) = p
i
(g)  
0
+ 
i
(g) (25)
Under (1), it can be veried that the second condition of Theorem 3.1 holds:

i
(g + g
i;j
)  
i
(g) =
 [2b
2
+ (1  n)(b + c)c]
[2b + (1  n)c][2b + c]
(26)
Note, however, that 2b
2
+(1 n)(b+ c)c > 0 is equivalent to 2+[(3n  3) (2n  3)] > 0,
and the latter is clearly true since 0 <  < 1. Thus the additional monotonicity condition
of Theorem 3.1 is satised. Therefore, the complete network is the unique stable network
in the case of price competition also. In contrast, Bloch (1995, Proposition 4) shows that
the unique equilibrium coalition structure in this case is identical to the one derived for the
Cournot model.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2: The proof builds on two lemmas. We state and prove them rst.
Lemma A: Let g be a stable network. Then every non-singleton component in g is complete.
Proof Suppose that g is a stable network and g
0
 g is a non-singleton component of g.
We show that g
0
must be complete. We know that no unique rm can have the lowest cost
in g
0
; this follows from an argument as in the rst part of Proposition 3.2. Thus, there must
exist at least a pair of rms i; j 2 N such that c
i
(g) = c
j
(g) = min
k2N
c
k
(g). Consider any
other rm l 2 g
0
, l 6= i; j. If such a rm has c
l
(g) > c
i
(g), then under (AC), clearly this
cannot be uniquely optimal for the rm. For instance, rm l can delete a link g
l;k
= 1 and
retain zero prots. Hence, all rms in g
0
must have the same costs, and these costs must be
minimum. Thus, c
j
(g) = min
k2g
c
k
(g) 8j 2 g
0
. Finally, if i; j 2 g
0
are not connected, then
under Assumption SY2(i), they can do strictly better by forming a link. Thus g
0
must be
complete. 2
Lemma B: In a stable network g, there can be at most one non-singleton component.
Proof Suppose there are two non-singleton components, g
0
and g
00
and let rm i 2 g
0
and
that rm j 2 g
00
. From the proof of Lemma A we know that rms i and j are minimum
cost rms. It now follows from Assumption SY2(i), that these rms can do strictly better
by forming a link. This violates condition (ii) in the denition of stability. Thus g is not
a stable, a contradiction. This shows that a stable network cannot have more than one
non-singleton component. 2
We have shown that in a market with four or more rms there can be at most one non-
singleton component, and that it is complete. This means that the only candidates for
stable networks are networks of the following form: there is a complete component with
k  1 rms and there are n  k singleton components. The proof of the theorem shows that
networks with k = 1 and k = 2 are not stable, while the networks with k  3 are stable.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: The candidates for stable networks can be parameterized in
terms of the size of the non-singleton component, k. Given the ex-ante symmetry of rms,
Assumption SY2(i) immediately implies that a network with k = 1 cannot be stable. Next
consider k = 2. This is a network with one component with 2 rms and (since n  4) at least
2 singleton components. Given specication (2), it follows that if the two singleton rms
form a link then they have will have the same costs as the two rms already in the 2 rm
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component. Under Assumption (AC) this yields them positive payos, violating requirement
(ii) in the denition of stability. Thus any network g with k = 2 is not stable. We are left
with networks where k  3. In such a network every rm i in the non-singleton component
is a minimum cost rm, with (say) marginal cost c
i
(g). Under specication (2), it follows
that c
i
(g) < c
j
(g), for all rms j which are singleton components. Thus under assumption
(AC), 
i
(g) > 0 and 
j
(g) = 0. Now suppose a rm j forms a link with another rm i. Then
the marginal cost of the former rm will fall still further and under (2) will remain below the
marginal cost of rm j. Thus rm j has no incentive to form such a link. Since k  3, and
competition is specied by assumption (AC), it is also clear that two singleton component
rms j and k do not have an incentive to form a link either. Finally, using assumption
(SY2(ii)), it follows that rms in the non-singleton component have no incentive to delete a
link. We have thus shown that both requirements (i) and (ii) are satised for any network
with the structure: a non-singleton complete component with k  3 rms and n k singleton
rms. This completes the proof. 2
7 Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 4.3: Since g is a stable network, i and j should have no incentive to
sever their link. Letting 
i
(g   g
i;j
)  
i
(g)  
i
(g   g
ij
):

i
(g   g
i;j
) + 
j
(g   g
i;j
) > 2f (27)
Let T
i
(g  g
i;j
)  (  
0
) + n
i
(g  g
i;j
)  
P
l 6=i

l
(g  g
i;j
). The above inequality can be
written as:
(n  1)
(n+ 1)
2
[T
i
(g   g
i;j
) + T
j
(g   g
ij
) + (n  1)] > f (28)
Now consider k 6= i; j such that 
k
(g  g
i;j
)  
j
(g  g
i;j
) but g
i;k
= 0. Consider the network
g + g
i;k
and let 
i
(g)  
i
(g + g
i;k
)  
i
(g). Then:

i
(g) + 
k
(g) =
2(n  1)
(n+ 1)
2
[T
i
(g) + T
k
(g) + (n  1)] (29)
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Note that:

l
(g) = 
l
(g   g
i;j
) + 1; l = i; j

k
(g) = 
k
(g   g
i;j
)  
j
(g   g
i;j
)

l
(g) = 
l
(g   g
i;j
); l 6= i; j; k (30)
Therefore, T
i
(g) = T
i
(g   g
i;j
) + (n  1) and T
k
(g)  T
j
(g   g
ij
)  2. Substituting in (29)
and recalling (28) it follows that:

i
(g) + 
k
(g) =
2(n  1)
(n+ 1)
2
[T
i
(g   g
i;j
) + (n  1) + T
j
(g   g
i;j
)  2 + (n  1)]
= 
i
(g   g
i;j
) + 
j
(g   g
i;j
) +
2(n  1)(n  3)
2
(n+ 1)
2
> 2f (31)
Therefore, i and k have a protable deviation from g by forming a link. This contradicts the
stability of g against transfers. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Suppose that g
s
is a star network with 1 rm at the center and
(n  1) rms at the spokes. Denote the center rm by n and typical rms at the spokes by
i and j. If rm n deletes all its links then we arrive at the empty network, denoted by g
e
.
If rm i or rm n deletes a link, then we arrive the network g
s
  g
n;i
. We now write down
the three incentive requirements. The requirement that rm n and rm i wish to maintain
their link may be written as:
[
n
(g
s
)  
n
(g
s
  g
n;i
)] + [
i
(g
s
)  
j
(g
s
  g
n;i
)] > 2f (32)
The requirement that rms i and j do not have an incentive to form a link may be written
as follows:
[
i
(g
s
+ g
i;j
)  
i
(g
s
)] + [
j
(g
s
+ g
i;j
)  
j
(g
s
)] < 2f (33)
The requirement that there exists a set of transfers such that rms have no incentives to
isolate themselves by deleting all their links is written as follows. For some t
i
, for i = 1; 2; ::n,
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it is true that

n
(g
s
)  (n )f +
X
j2N
n
(g)
(t
n
j
  t
j
n
)  
n
(g
e
)

i
(g
s
)  f + (t
i
n
  t
n
i
)  
i
(g
s
  g
n;i
); 8i 2 Nnfng: (34)
We note that the gross prots for dierent rms can be written as follows:

n
(g
s
) =
[  
0
+ (n  1)
2
]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(35)

n
(g
s
  g
n;i
) =
[  
0
+ (n  2)(n  1)]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(36)

n
(g
e
) =
[  
0
]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(37)

i
(g
s
) =
[  
0
+ (3  n)]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(38)

i
(g
s
  g
n;i
) =
[  
0
  2(n  2)]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(39)

i
(g
s
+ g
i;j
) =
[  
0
+ 2]
2
(n+ 1)
2
(40)
We now substitute the above payo terms in the incentive conditions(32)-(34). We start
with (32). After substitution and rearrangement, we get the following term.
(n  1)[4(  
0
) + (n  1)(2n  3)  (3n  7)]
(n + 1)
2
> 2f (41)
Similarly, (33) can be rewritten as follows:
2(n  1)[2(  
0
) + (2  n+ 3)]
(n + 1)
2
< 2f (42)
Dene:
F
0
=
(n  1)[4(  
0
) + (n  1)(2n  3)  (3n  7)]
2(n+ 1)
2
(43)
F
L
=
2(n  1)[2(  
0
) + (2  n + 3)]
2(n+ 1)
2
(44)
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Conditions (32) and (33) are satised if and only if the xed costs are such that F
L
< f < F
0
.
It is easily veried that F
L
< F
0
if n > 3.
Finally, we construct the set of transfers. Recall that we only require that there exists a set
of transfers which makes rms want to retain their links in g
s
rather than delete all their
links. Note that for the star to be stable it must be the case that the spokes do not have an
incentive to form a link with each other. Given the symmetry in their situation, it follows
that their marginal payos from the additional link are the same. This requirement taken
along with increasing returns implies that if the star is to be stable then it must be the case
that each of the spoke rms also do not have an incentive to form a link with the central
rm. Thus transfers have to made by the central rm to each of the spokes. The minimum
value of this transfer is given by:
t
i
n
= 
i
(g
s
  g
n;i
)  
i
(g
s
) + f (45)
Given the above expressions we can rewrite this minimum transfer as:
t
i
n
= f  
(n  1)[2(  
0
)  (3n  7)]
(n+ 1)
2
(46)
We wish to show that the central rm has an incentive to make such transfers to each of the
spoke rms rather than delete all links. This incentive is satised if and only if:

n
(g
s
)  (n  1)(f + t
i
n
)  
n
(g
e
) (47)
After some rearrangement this requirement can be expressed as:
(n  1)[4(  
0
) + (n  1)
2
   (3n  7)]
(n+ 1)
2
 2f (48)
Dene:
F
00
=
(n  1)[4(  
0
) + (n  1)
2
   (3n  7)]
2(n+ 1)
2
(49)
It can be checked that F
00
> F
L
, for all n > 3. Dene F
H
= minfF
0
; F
00
g. The proof now
follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3 We prove the parts in sequence.
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(i). Suppose g is connected and asymmetric. It follows then that g induces a partition
with at least two elements. The claim is proved if we show that 
i
(g)   
j
(g)  2 for any
pair i 2 h
l+1
(g) and j 2 h
l
(g) with 1  l  m   1. Suppose 
i
(g)   
j
(g) = 1. Then
there exists some player k 6= i; j such that g
i;k
= 1 but g
j;k
= 0. However, note that

i
(g   g
i;k
) = 
j
(g   g
i;k
) = 
j
(g). Hence, from Lemma 4.3 we infer that g is not stable
against transfers, a contradiction.
(ii). Suppose to the contrary that 
i
(g) < n  1 for i 2 h
m
(g). Consider any j 6= i such that
g
i;j
= 0. Since g is connected, there exists some k 6= i; j such that g
j;k
= 1. However, by
denition of h
m
(g), 
i
(g   g
j;k
) > 
k
(g   g
j;k
). Lemma 4.3 now implies that since g
i;j
= 0, g
is not stable against transfers.
(iii). Suppose not. Then there exists some k 2 h
l
00
(g), l
00
 l
0
, such that g
i;k
= 0. However,
by assumption, 
k
(g  g
i;j
) > 
j
(g  g
i;j
). Therefore, from Lemma 4.3 g is not stable against
transfers, a contradiction. This completes the proof of the rst part of the statement.
We now show that if i; j 2 h
1
(g), then g
i;j
= 0. Suppose not. From the previous argument,
g
i;k
= 1 8k 6= i. This implies 
i
(g) = n  1, a contradiction to the hypothesis that i 2 h
1
(g).
We next show that if i 2 h
1
(g) and j 2 h
m
(g), then g
i;j
= 1. Suppose to the contrary that
g
i;j
= 0 for some i 2 h
1
(g) and j 2 h
m
(g). This implies from the previous argument that
g
i;k
= 0 8k 2 Nnfig, thereby contradicting the connectedness of g.
Finally we show that if i 2 h
1
(g) and j 2 h
l
(g), for l < m then g
i;j
= 0. Suppose to the
contrary that g
i;j
= 1 for some i 2 h
1
(g) and j 2 h
l
(g) for 1 < l < m. By the argument
above, this implies that rm j has a link with all rms k 6= j, i.e. 
j
(g) = n   1. Hence,
j 2 h
m
(g), a contradiction. We note that this result also implies that h
1
(g) is the unique
element of the partition with this property.
(iv). We prove this part by induction. Fix l = 1. We rst show that if i 2 h
m 1
(g) then
g
i;j
= 0, for j 2 h
1
(g). Suppose this claim is false. Then g
i;j
= 1 for some j 2 h
1
(g).
From part (iii), this implies that g
i;k
= 1 8k 2 h
l
(g), l  1, which implies 
i
(g) = n   1.
This contradicts the hypothesis that i 2 h
m 1
(g). We next show that if j 2 h
k
(g), k > 1,
then g
i;j
= 1. Suppose not and let g
i;j
= 0. Then from part (iii) it follows that g
j;k
= 0
8k =2 h
m
(g). Then from part (iii) this implies j 2 h
1
(g), a contradiction.
Now suppose that the hypothesis is true for
^
l  1, i.e. if i 2 h
m 
^
l
(g), then g
i;j
= 1 if and
only if j 2 h
k
(g), k >
^
l. We now show that the hypothesis is also true for
^
l + 1.
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We rst prove that if i 2 h
m 
^
l 1
(g) and j 2 h
k
(g), k 
^
l + 1, then g
i;j
= 0. Suppose the
claim is false. Then g
i;j
= 1 for some j 2 h
l
(g), l 
^
l + 1. From part (iii), this implies
g
i;r
= 1, 8r 2 h
l
(g), l 
^
l + 1. Using the induction hypothesis, this means 
i
(g)  
r
(g) for
r 2 h
m 
^
l
(g). This contradicts the hypothesis that i 2 h
m 
^
l 1
.
To prove the converse, we need to show that for any j 2 h
k
(g), k >
^
l + 1, implies g
i;j
= 1.
Suppose not. Then g
i;j
= 0 for some j 2 h
l
(g) for l >
^
l + 1. Then g
j;k
= 0, 8k 2 h
l
0
(g),
l
0
 m 
^
l   1. However, this implies j 2 h
^
l+1
(g), a contradiction. 2
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Figure 1a: Complete Network
Figure 1b: Empty Network
Figure 1: Symmetric Pair-Wise Stable Networks for n=5
Figure 2a: Dominant Group with No
Fringe Firms
Figure 2b: Dominant Group with
One Fringe Firm
Figure 2c: Dominant Group with
Two Fringe Firms
Figure 2: Dominant Group Architecture for n=5
Figure 5b: Two Inter-Linked Stars
with Firms 1 and 2 as the Centers
Figure 5a: Star Network with Firm 1
as the Center
Figure 5c: Three Inter-Linked Stars
with Firms 1,2 and 3 as the Centers
Figure 5d: Four Asymmetrically-
Sized Inter-Linked Stars
Figure 5: Asymmetric Connected Networks that are Pair-Wise Stable Against Transfers for
n=6
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Figure 3: Pair-Wise Stability of the Dominant Group Architecture
 
Figure 4: Non-Monotonicity in Size of Dominant Group with respect to Cost of
Link Formation
